

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 083990

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT KINSHASA 3484 ACTION SECSTATE 14 APR 77

QUOTE S E C R E T KINSHASA 3484

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, CG

SUDJ: SHABA INVASION: CONSULTATIONS WITH MOBUTU, APRIL 13

REF: A) STATE 82506; B) KINSHASA 3441

SUMMARY: MOBUTU INDICATED TO ME GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH US
DECISION TO AUTHORIZE ADDITIONAL THIRTEEN MILLION DOLLARS MILITARY
ASSISTANCE, ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR HE ANTICIPATES NEEDING MORE. IN
RESPONSE TO MY STRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF PURSUING DIPLOMATIC
RATHER THAN SOLELY MILITARY SOLUTION TO SHABA PROBLEM, MOBUTU
REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH NETO SHOULD
COME ONLY AFTER INVADERS HAVE BEEN FORCED BACK INTO ANGOLA. END

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SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 083990

SUMMARY.

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REF A, I MET WITH
MOBUTU EVENING APRIL 13. FOREIGN MINISTER NGUZA WAS ALSO
PRESENT.

2. I FIRST REVIEWED MAJOR ELEMENTS OF USG DECISION TO AUTHORIZE

EXPENDITURE OF THIRTEEN MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS FUNDS, WHICH MOBUTU (AND I) HAD FIRST LEARNED FROM VOA BROADCAST THE EVENING BEFORE. I STRESSED ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO HELP FILL ZAIRE'S MOST URGENT NEEDS FOR NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT, BUT THAT DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HAD MADE CLEAR WE COULD NOT AT THIS TIME RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR ARMS AND AMMUNITION. I SAID THAT, AS ANNOUNCED, THE THIRTEEN MILLION DOLLARS BROKE DOWN ROUGHLY INTO NINE MILLION DOLLARS FOR C-130, ONE MILLION FOR POL, AND THE REMAINDER FOR THE VARIOUS ITEMS RECENTLY REQUESTED BY GOZ. MOBUTU SEEMED SATISFIED WITH ALL THIS ALTHOUGH IT WAS EVIDENT HE WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION (PROBABLY CONVEYED TO HIM BY GENERAL BABIA) THAT THE C-130 WAS IN ADDITION TO THE ONE ALREADY ORDERED WITH FY-76 FUNDS. HE ACCEPTED MY EXPLANATION THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, ALTHOUGH HE WAS CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED. WHEN HE INQUIRED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE FURTHER ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED, I SAID IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WASHINGTON WAS PREPARED TO EXAMINE ADDITIONAL REQUESTS FOR EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN ARMS AND AMMUNITION.

3. I THEN WENT ON TO DESCRIBE SOME OF THE STEPS WE INTENDED TO TAKE IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE, INCLUDING EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF FY-77 CIP AND PL-480 LOANS AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO IMF, IBRD, PRIVATE BANKS AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO SHOW UNDERSTANDING OF ZAIRE'S CURRENT DEBT PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, I DECIDED TO DEFER RAISING QUESTION OF POSTPONEMENT OF PARIS CLUB AND CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETINGS PENDING CLARIFICATION OF POINTS COVERED IN REF B. MOBUTU SEEMED TO APPRECIATE THESE STEPS AS WELL, ALTHOUGH AS USUAL WHEN WE GET INTO ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS HE DISPLAYED LESS INTEREST AND MADE FEW COMMENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 083990

4. ON THE DIPLOMATIC SIDE, I REITERATED OUR SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAN MEDIATION EFFORT AND ASKED HOW HE VIEWED THIS NOW THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION SEEMED TO BE IMPROVING IN SHABA. MOBUTU ASKED WHAT, REALLY, WAS THERE TO MEDIATE? IF ANGOLA MAINTAINED IT WAS NOT INVOLVED, THEN HOW COULD IT BE EXPECTED TO NEGOTIATE ON AN ISSUE IT CLAIMED DID NOT CONCERN IT? AS HE HAD STATED THE DAY BEFORE TO THE PRESS, ZAIRE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE ITS OWN NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. ZAIRE HAD THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT AND DUTY TO REPEL THE AGGRESSORS IN SHABA. THEY HAD ENTERED ZAIRE BY FORCE AND THEY MUST BE EXPELLED THE SAME WAY. ONCE THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED, THEN THE GOZ WOULD SEE ABOUT RESUMING DISCUSSIONS OF BILATERAL ISSUES WITH LUANDA, PERHAPS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIXED COMMISSION ORIGINALLY SET UP FOR THIS PURPOSE. AS FOR THE NIGERIANS, MOBUTU HOPED THEY COULD GUARD THE FRONTIER IN SHABA, PREVENTING MOVEMENT EITHER WAY, AFTER THE INVADERS HAD BEEN EXPELLED. THE NIGERIANS MIGHT ALSO ASSIST IN THE BILATERAL TALKS, ALTHOUGH MOBUTU'S VIEW OF THIS DID NOT SEEM VERY PRECISE.

5. I SAID WE REMAINED SOLIDLY IN SUPPORT OF THE NIGERIAN INITIATIVE AND CONTINUED TO HOPE THAT THE SHABA CONFLICT COULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IT WAS IMPORTANT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF OUR OWN CONTINUING EFFORTS TO ASSIST ZAIRE MILITARILY THAT ZAIRE MAKE CLEAR IT HAS IN NO WAY ABANDONED A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. WHILE I COULD UNDERSTAND ZAIRE'S DETERMINATION TO EXPEL THE INVADERS, THERE WAS ALWAYS THE RISK OF ESCALATION WHICH OF COURSE CONCERNED US. IN THAT CONNECTION, I MENTIONED PUBLISHED ALLEGATIONS OF FAZ AERIAL STRIKES INTO ZAMBIA (SEE SEPTTEL) AND REPORTS THAT THE FNLA AND FLEC WERE AGAIN ACTIVELY OPERATING AGAINST ANGOLA. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MOBUTU HAD OVER A LONG PERIOD GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD NOT PERMIT SUCH OPERATIONS, THAT I WAS PERSONALLY CONVINCED HE HAD DONE WHAT HE COULD TO IMPLEMENT THESE ASSURANCES, AND THAT I HAD SO REPORTED TO WASHINGTON. NEVERTHELESS, ANY IMPRESSION THAT ZAIRE HAD CHANGED ITS POLICY TOWARD FNLA AND FLEC, AND THAT THESE GROUPS WERE THEREBY RE-ACTIVATING THEIR PROGRAMS AGAINST ANGOLA,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 083990

COULD OF COURSE HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON US AND OTHER NATIONS' ATTITUDES.

6. MOBUTU SEEMED TO REACT SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVELY, ASKING WHETHER I REALLY THOUGHT HE HAD GONE BACK ON HIS WORD TO RESTRAIN FNLA AND FLEC. I SAID THAT WAS NOT WHAT I MEANT; RATHER, IN VIEW OF ANGOLAN ALLEGATIONS AND OCCASIONAL PRESS REPORTS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE GROUPS, WE BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE IMPRESSION OF GOZ SUPPORT FOR THEM NOT GAIN CREDENCE. MOBUTU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND DID NOT COMMENT FURTHER.

7. OUR CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH YET ANOTHER DISCUSSION OF US PUBLIC STATEMENTS. REFERRING AGAIN TO AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S RECENT COMMENTS, MOBUTU SAID HE GETS CONFUSED AS TO WHO IS REALLY ARTICULATING OFFICIAL US VIEWS AND, FOR THAT MATTER, WHAT US POLICY TOWARD AFRICA IS. ARE WE OR ARE WE NOT CONCERNED ABOUT COMMUNISM IN AFRICA? DO WE INTEND TO GO ON HELPING THOSE AFRICAN STATES THAT ARE THEMSELVES CONCERNED? OR MUST AFRICAN MODERATES TURN RADICAL AND LOOK TO THE SOVIETS AS THEIR ONLY OPTION? WHILE THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO REALLY GO INTO THESE ISSUES, MOBUTU'S MESSAGE WAS NEVERTHELESS CLEAR AND I SUSPECT WE'LL HEAR MUCH MORE ALONG THIS LINE IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

8. AS I LEFT MOBUTU'S OFFICE I WAS AMBUSHED BY A TELEVISION CREW FROM ZAIRE'S OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY-- A SURE SIGN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT FOR POLITICAL REASONS HE WISHES LOCAL PUBLICITY. IN MY REMARKS I STRESSED ZAIRE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND UNITY AS FORMING THE FRAMEWORK FOR OUR CURRENT ASSISTANCE.

9. SUGGEST DEPT PASS LAGOS, BRUSSELS, PARIS.

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UNQUOTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
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Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Disposition Event:
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Disposition Reason:
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